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It is generally recognised that the potential positive and negative impacts of 
geoengineering will be distributed unevenly both geographically and 
temporally. The question of distributive justice in geoengineering thus is one of 
the major ethical issues associated with geoengineering. Currently, the 
question of distributive justice in geoengineering is framed in terms of who 
gets what (potential) benefits and harms from geoengineering, i.e. it is about 
the distribution of the outcomes of geoengineering. In this paper, I argue that 
the discussions on distributive justice in geoengineering should not be 
outcome-based. Instead, it should be risk-based. I identify two problems for 
framing the question of distributive justice in geoengineering in terms of the 
distribution of its outcomes, i.e. the ‘if and then’ syndrome and the limited 
applicability of distributive principles in geoengineering policy, and suggest risk 
is a more proper object of distribution in the case of geoengineering. Following 
Hayenhjelm, I argue that the object of distribution in the case of fair 
distribution of risk should be (i) sources of risks and (ii) precautionary 
measures. I shall then demonstrate how it can be applied to the question of 
distributive justice in geoengineering. Finally, I end this paper by exploring the 
possible responses to the question of distributive justice in geoengineering by 
three major accounts of distributive justice, i.e. egalitarianism, prioritarianism, 
and sufficientarianism. 
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Geoengineering is the idea of “deliberately alter[ing] the climate system to 
counter climate change” (IPCC 2013, 27), and it is generally recognised that its 
potential positive and negative impacts will be distributed unevenly both 
geographically and temporally.1 The question of distributive justice in 
geoengineering thus is one of the major ethical issues associated with 
geoengineering. For example, in an overview of the ethics of geoengineering, 
Preston notes that “efforts must be made to distribute the benefits and burdens 
of [geoengineering] fairly… To the degree that the characteristics of an 
engineered climate can be predicted, choices will have to be made about who 
gets what in a geoengineered world” (Preston 2013, 30). Similarly, in their 
analysis of sulphate aerosol geoengineering2 from the perspective of distributive 
justice, Svoboda, Keller, Goes and Tuana (2011) discuss how harms and benefits 
of sulphate aerosol geoengineering ought to be shared among individuals in 
accordance with John Rawls’ (and Rawlsian), Ronald Dworkin’s, Amartya Sen’s, 
and the desert-based theory of distributive justice, and examine whether 
sulphate aerosol geoengineering meets the requirement of distributive justice in 
accordance to those theories. These examples illustrate one way to explore the 
question of distributive justice in geoengineering, i.e. who gets what (potential) 
benefits and harms from geoengineering. In short, this approach is about the 
distribution of the outcomes of geoengineering. While I am sympathetic to this 
approach, framing the question this way can be inadequate and misleading, 
particularly because it fails to take seriously the condition of risk and uncertainty 
in geoengineering. 
 
In this paper, I argue the discussions on distributive justice in geoengineering 
should not be outcome-based, i.e. it should not focus on the distribution of 
(potential) benefits and harms from geoengineering. Instead, it should be risk-
based, i.e. it should focus on the distribution of the risks associated with 
geoengineering. In the next section, I identify two problems for framing the 
question of distributive justice in geoengineering in terms of the distribution of 
the outcomes, i.e. the ‘if and then’ syndrome and the limited applicability of 
distributive principles in geoengineering policy, and suggest risk is a more 
proper object of distribution in the case of geoengineering. Following 
Hayenhjelm (2012), I argue that the objection of distribution in the case of fair 
distribution of risk should be (i) sources of risks and (ii) precautionary measures. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  different	  types	  of	  geoengineering	  and	  their	  global	  and	  regional,	  long-­‐term	  and	  short-­‐term	  impacts,	  see	  Vaughan	  &	  Lenton	  (2011),	  Harrison	  &	  Hester	  (2014).	  2	  Sulphate	  aerosol	  geoengineering	  refers	  to	  the	  injection	  of	  sulphate	  aerosols	  into	  the	  lower	  stratosphere	  to	  cool	  the	  climate.	  	  




I shall then demonstrate how it can be applied to the question of distributive 
justice in geoengineering.3 Finally, I end this paper by exploring the possible 
responses to the question of distributive justice in geoengineering by three 
major accounts of distributive justice, i.e. egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and 
sufficientarianism.  
 
Two Problems with Potential Benefits and Harms: Uncertainty and Risk in 
Geoengineering 
Like other new and emerging technologies, the consequences of 
geoengineering are uncertain. The uncertainty in geoengineering is in part due 
to the complexity and chaotic nature of the climate system, which 
geoengineering attempts to interfere with (IPCC 2013), and it is also in part due 
to the fact that the eventual outcomes of geoengineering will be determined by 
its effectiveness (Royal Society 2007; Vaughan & Lenton 2011; Harrison & 
Hester 2014). Moreover, the society’s responses to geoengineering research and 
its implementation will too add to the uncertainty of the outcomes of 
geoengineering (see, e.g. Sollie 2007; Healy 2012; Hunter 2013). Uncertainty in 
geoengineering entails that its outcomes cannot be reliably predicted, which 
presents an immediate challenge to the discussions on the question of 
distributive justice in geoengineering proceed in terms of potential benefits and 
harms, i.e. the outcome-based approach, because the outcomes cannot be 
reliably known before an implementation, nor will the potential benefits and 
harms always actualise. Accordingly, answers to the question of justice in 
geoengineering based on potential benefits and harms are at best inconclusive 
and at worst wrongheaded.4 More specifically, the discussions based on potential 
benefits and harms are derived from the input assumptions about the climate 
system, geoengineering and the society’s responses to them, and thus they only 
concern possible states of affairs and they are conditional upon the truth of 
those assumptions. Moreover, as the outcome-based approach focuses on the 
distribution of benefits and harms from geoengineering, uncertainty of the 
outcomes entails the possibility of erroneous (re)distribution if the projected 
benefits and harms do not actualise. More radically, it can be argued that 
uncertainty in geoengineering can mute the discussions on distributive justice in 
geoengineering based on the (potential) outcomes of geoengineering, as we 
cannot reliably predict them, or at least we do not know whether or not they will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Different	  types	  of	  geoengineering	  options	  are	  associated	  with	  different	  types	  of	  risks,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  different	  types	  of	  risks	  has	  little	  implication	  for	  my	  claim	  that	  analyses	  of	  distributive	  justice	  in	  geoengineering	  should	  be	  risk-­‐based.	  4	  Hunter	  (2013)	  has	  discussed	  similar	  problems	  with	  justice-­‐based	  objections	  to	  synthetic	  biology	  arise	  from	  uncertainty,	  but	  he	  has	  not	  drawn	  the	  distinction	  between	  outcome	  and	  risk	  in	  his	  discussion,	  nor	  has	  he	  discussed	  the	  applicability	  of	  normative	  distributive	  principles	  in	  policy-­‐making.	  




actualise before an implementation, thus talks about distributive justice and the 
outcomes of geoengineering can only be guesswork. I shall not pursue the 
radical argument in further details, but the radical argument from uncertainty is 
useful in illuminating one of the difficulties for the outcome-based approach. 
 
The outcome-based approach becomes especially problematic when they 
conflate possible states of affairs with actual (or future) states of affairs, and 
stage them as the central concerns for ethical reflection. The problem can be 
characterised by what Nordmann labelled as the ‘if and then’ syndrome: "an if-
and-then statement opens by suggesting a possible technological development 
and continues with a consequence that demands immediate attention. What 
looks like an improbable, merely possible future in the first half of the sentence, 
appears in the second half as something inevitable. And as the hypothetical gets 
displaced by a supposed actual, an imagined future overwhelms the present” 
(2007, 32).5 In short, the ‘if and then’ syndrome reminds the danger of 
overlooking the epistemic gap between ‘might’ and ‘being’ (or ‘will be’), and 
wrongly emphasises the merely possible as the most ethically significant; at the 
same time, the ‘if and then’ syndrome also calls attention to a failure to 
recognise the more immediate ethical concerns in the normative analysis of new 
and emerging technology. 
 
To illustrate the problem with the outcome-based approach with an example, 
Svoboda et al. have sought to show that sulphate aerosol geoengineering could 
not satisfy the requirement of distributive justice specified by various theories of 
distributive justice by noting the potential harms from sulphate aerosol 
geoengineering (2011, 161-167). Yet, as I have already pointed out, whether or 
not the potential harms will actualise (and the severity of the actualised harms) 
will depend on various technical and social factors in the context of (post-
)implementation; Svoboda et al. thus can only conclude that sulphate aerosol 
geoengineering might not satisfy the requirement of distributive justice specified 
by different theories of distributive justice, depending on whether or not the 
predicted harmful events happen (and, the individuals are indeed harmed by 
those events). In short, their arguments are at best inconclusive; however, their 
argument can also be misleading – by giving an impression that sulphate aerosol 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Nordmann’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  ‘if	  and	  then’	  syndrome	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  a	  critique	  of	  speculative	  ethics,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  my	  aim	  to	  evaluate	  if	  Nordmann’s	  critique	  is	  successful	  or	  not	  in	  this	  paper.	  The	  ‘if	  and	  then’	  syndrome	  is	  useful	  here	  in	  highlighting	  the	  emphasis	  on	  possible	  states	  of	  affairs	  and	  the	  negligence	  of	  
present	  states	  of	  affairs.	  




geoengineering will cause such harms, and therefore will be unjust.6 Here, I am 
not challenging the claim that sulphate aerosol geoengineering might fail to 
satisfy the requirement of distributive justice, it might well be; what I attempted 
to point out is the conditionality of the outcome-based approach and the danger 
of conflating possibility with actuality (or necessity) in arguing against or for 
geoengineering. In short, insofar as the outcomes of geoengineering cannot be 
reliably predicted, and they are determined in part by factors in the context of 
use, the outcome-based arguments will inevitably be weak.7  
 
More importantly, however, is their focus on the distribution of potential 
outcomes of geoengineering appears to signify a form of ethical hypermetropia, 
i.e. a farsightedness in normative analysis that fails to perceive a more 
immediate ethical concern in the question of distributive justice in 
geoengineering. It is worth to be reminded that geoengineering raises the 
question of distributive justice not only because of the eventual benefits and 
harms from it will be distributed unequally, which is the focus of Svoboda et al 
and, more generally, of the outcome-based approach. Geoengineering raises 
question of distributive justice also because it imposes differentiated degree of 
risks to various regions and various groups of individuals, which in itself is 
ethically problematic regardless of whether or not the risks associated with 
geoengineering materialise. Hence, geoengineering risks ought to be taken more 
seriously in the discussions.  
 
Another problem with the outcome-based approach is its limited application in 
geoengineering policy. Ideally, normative distributive principles derived from 
various theories of distributive justice should perform these two functions: (i) 
normatively evaluate distribution patterns (and institutions responsible for 
them), and (ii) guide policy-making and institutional design such that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  To	  be	  fair,	  Svoboda	  et	  al.	  have	  acknowledged	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  geoengineering	  in	  their	  discussion,	  and	  thus	  they	  do	  acknowledge	  the	  conditionality	  of	  their	  argument.	  However,	  they	  think	  the	  research	  on	  the	  potential	  impacts	  of	  sulphate	  aerosol	  geoengineering	  via	  simulation	  and	  modelling	  has	  provided	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  rest	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  on	  the	  proponents	  of	  sulphate	  aerosol	  geoengineering.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  simulation	  and	  modelling	  cannot	  capture	  technical	  and	  social	  factors	  arise	  in	  the	  context	  of	  use,	  I	  am	  less	  certain	  than	  Svoboda	  et	  al.	  on	  where	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  should	  rest.	  7	  My	  formulation	  of	  the	  argument	  focuses	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  geoengineering,	  but	  it	  applies	  to	  both	  geoengineering	  research	  and	  implementation	  of	  geoengineering.	  It	  is	  indeed	  possible	  to	  speculate	  the	  outcomes	  of	  geoengineering	  research,	  but	  speculation	  only	  denotes	  possible	  states	  of	  affairs,	  and	  whether	  those	  possible	  states	  of	  affairs	  will	  actualise	  depend	  on	  various	  technical	  and	  social	  factors	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  unforeseeable	  in/during	  geoengineering	  research.	  Again,	  instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  potential	  benefits	  or	  harms	  that	  might	  or	  might	  not	  actualise,	  I	  believe	  the	  discussions	  on	  distributive	  justice	  and	  geoengineering	  research	  should	  focus	  on	  risks	  associated	  with	  geoengineering	  research.	  




resulting distribution patterns are just.8 In the context of geoengineering policy, 
normative distributive principles (and theories of distributive justice) should 
enable us to evaluate if a distributive pattern resulting from a particular 
geoengineering option is just, and also to guide the development and 
implementation of geoengineering in accordance with some accounts of 
distributive justice. In the following, I show that the outcome-based approach 
can only perform the first function but not the second, i.e. it can only be used in 
rejecting (or approving) particular forms of geoengineering but it cannot provide 
other policy recommendation, such as how a particular geoengineering should be 
implemented, etc.  
 
My case against the applicability of normative distributive principles in the 
outcome-based approach is drawn from our inability to distribute the (potential) 
benefits and harms from geoengineering. Without the capacity to distribute the 
(potential) outcomes of geoengineering, it is impossible to attain distribution 
patterns recommended by various normative distributive principles. To illustrate 
this argument, consider two distribution patterns, X and Y: 
Distribution Pattern X: In a group of 10 individuals, every individual will be 
provided 1 unit of goods. 
Distribution Pattern Y: In a group of 10 individuals, a designated individual 
will receive 5.5 units of goods, and the remaining 9 individuals will be 
provided 0.5 units of goods. 
Evaluating X and Y with a simplistic form of egalitarian distributive principle, i.e. 
every individuals should have the same amount of goods, X is considered to be 
fair, whereas Y is not, because individuals in Y do not receive the same amount 
of goods. Also, the simplistic form of egalitarian distributive principle should 
recommend a change in distribution pattern such that each individual in Y will 
receive the same amount of goods. Now, assume that it is theoretical and 
practically impossible to change the distribution pattern in Y, the simple 
egalitarian distributive principle can only conclude that Y is unjust, but it cannot 
provide any useful recommendation to ameliorate the situation in Y, because it 
cannot ex hypothesi. 
 
The example above is analogous to the case of geoengineering, i.e. the 
potential outcomes of geoengineering cannot be distributed unless we have the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  debates	  on	  the	  proper	  role	  of	  normative	  distributive	  principles	  in	  political	  philosophy.	  It	  is	  not	  my	  aim	  here	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  view	  that	  normative	  distributive	  principles	  must	  be	  policy-­‐guiding;	  however,	  I	  think,	  an	  approach	  that	  allows	  normative	  distributive	  principle	  to	  offer	  policy	  recommendation	  is	  at	  least	  practically	  more	  preferable	  in	  the	  context	  of	  geoengineering	  than	  one	  that	  does	  not.	  




capacity to control the climate system such that we can change the distribution 
patterns of the benefits and harms from geoengineering, or in short to specify 
“who gets what in a geoengineered world”. In other words, the applicability of 
normative distributive principles is limited to the rejection or approval of various 
geoengineering options with reference to the potential outcomes of 
geoengineering. In response to this, some might argue that while we cannot 
distribute the potential benefits and harms from geoengineering directly, we can 
still distribute – or, redistribute – the consequences of geoengineering indirectly 
by means of compensation, i.e. by compensating those who are harmed by 
geoengineering, or even by providing ex ante compensation to those who will be 
harmed by geoengineering.9 So construed, in the case of geoengineering, some 
forms of redistribution are indeed possible.  
I do not deny the importance of compensation in fully addressing the question 
of justice in geoengineering (see, e.g. Svoboda & Irvine 2014; Wong, Douglas & 
Savulescu 2014). Indeed, I agree that compensation is required to address the 
harms – particularly, unforeseeable harms – brought by geoengineering. 
However, compensation does not provide the answer to the limited applicability 
of normative distributive principles I have outlined. For instance, in the case of 
ex post compensation, normative distributive principles come in play only after 
the implementation, thus their applicability remains limited in planning and 
devising geoengineering; and, in the case of ex ante compensation, normative 
distributive principles too have limited role because the focus is economic and 
does not concern how geoengineering is to be implemented. In this respect, 
compensation only adds another layer to determine whether or not a 
geoengineering option is permissible. 
 
The limited applicability of normative distributive principles is due to the 
framing of the question using the potential benefits and harms from 
geoengineering, which we have no control over. If normative distributive 
principles are to contribute to geoengineering policy beyond merely rejecting or 
approving various geoengineering options, then a different object of distribution 
is needed, and relatedly a move away from the outcome-based approach is 
required. In the following section, I shall argue that unlike potential benefits and 
harms from geoengineering which we have no control over and thus cannot 
distribute, there is a sensible way to talk about the distribution of risk. So 
construed, focusing on geoengineering risks allows us to bypass the problem of 
limited applicability of normative distributive principles in geoengineering policy, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	  viability	  of	  offering	  ex	  ante	  compensation,	  of	  course,	  depends	  on	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  implementation,	  and	  relatedly	  the	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  in	  geoengineering.	  




and offers an alternative approach that can provide policy recommendation 
beyond the permissibility of geoengineering.  
 
Given the two problems for the outcome-based, i.e. the danger of the ‘if and 
then’ syndrome and the limited applicability of normative principles in 
geoengineering policy, I think we have good reasons to abandon it. In addition, 
the imminence of risks as an ethical concern in the question of distributive 
justice in geoengineering and the possibility of a meaningful discussion on the 
distribution of risk suggest a shift towards a risk-based approach is needed.  
 
3. Distributive Justice and Geoengineering: A Risk-Based Approach 
Central to the risk-based approach is the distribution of risk.10 Recently, 
Hayenhjelm (2012) has offered an instructive account of how risks can be fairly 
distributed, which can serve as a theoretical basis for a risk-based approach to 
the question of distributive justice in geoengineering.11 She argues that the 
considerations of a fair distribution of risk should be framed in terms of (i) 
sources of risks and (ii) precautionary measures. Accordingly, a risk-based 
approach should focus on distributing sources of risks and precautionary 
measures related to geoengineering, but not its potential outcomes. I shall not 
repeat the details of Hayenhjelm’s discussion, but it is useful to outline the 
reasons for taking sources of risks and precautionary measures as the objects of 
distribution. 
 
Hayenhjelm notes that risk imposition usually involves distribution of activities 
with an expected probability of harm, which is an estimate of the frequency of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  term	  ‘risk’	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  different	  concepts,	  for	  example,	  Hansson	  has	  identified	  five	  uses	  of	  the	  term:	  (1)	  Risk	  =	  an	  unwanted	  event	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  occur.	  (2)	  Risk	  =	  the	  cause	  of	  an	  unwanted	  event	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  occur.	  	  (3)	  Risk	  =	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  unwanted	  event	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  occur.	  (4)	  Risk	  =	  the	  statistical	  expectation	  value	  of	  unwanted	  events	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  occur.	  (5)	  Risk	  =	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  decision	  is	  made	  under	  conditions	  of	  known	  probabilities	  ("decision	  under	  risk")	  (2004,	  10).	  He	  notes	  that	  (4)	  is	  the	  standard	  understanding	  of	  ‘risk’	  in	  risk	  analysis,	  which	  is	  often	  based	  on	  objectivist	  
expected	  utility	  that	  is	  calculated	  with	  objectivist	  probabilities	  with	  objectivist	  utility.	  Hansson	  has	  pointed	  out	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  standard	  understanding	  of	  ‘risk’	  in	  philosophy	  and	  ethics	  of	  risk,	  which	  I	  shall	  not	  repeat	  here.	  Here,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  note	  that	  Hayenhjelm’s	  account	  of	  distributive	  justice	  and	  risk	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  providing	  another	  route	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  standard	  understanding	  of	  ‘risk’.	  As	  her	  account	  introduces	  considerations	  that	  are	  not	  readily	  accounted	  for	  by	  “the	  statistical	  expectation	  value	  of	  unwanted	  events	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  occur”,	  i.e.	  sources	  of	  risks	  and	  precautionary	  measures,	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  risk.	  11	  While	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  attention	  to	  philosophy	  and	  ethics	  of	  risk	  (see,	  e.g.	  Lewens	  (2007),	  Asveld	  &	  Roeser	  (2009),	  Roeser	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  Hayenhjelm	  &	  Wolff	  (2012),	  Hansson	  (2013)),	  relatively	  little	  has	  been	  said	  about	  distributive	  justice.	  Hayenhjelm’s	  discussion	  on	  the	  topic	  is	  particularly	  useful	  for	  the	  current	  purpose,	  as	  she	  explicitly	  reflects	  on	  the	  object(s)	  of	  distribution	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  risk.	  




such a harm to occur for those activities. Accordingly, imposing a risk on a group 
of individuals is to subject them to an activity that carries a specific chance of 
harm; however, such a chance of harm will not be distributed equally among the 
group because who will actually be harmed depends on a variety of factors 
beyond merely being subjected to the activity and exposed to the chance of 
harm it carries. Moreover, as Hayenhjelm rightly notes, the probability denotes 
the frequency of an event to occur for a given reference class, but not for a 
particular individual. She thus rejects the probability of harm of an activity as a 
proper object of distribution in the distribution of risk, as it says little about 
individuals’ actual chance of suffering from the harm. In other words, even if 
each individual is subjected to the same risky activity, it does not entails that 
each of them will have the same chance to suffer the harm it brings; and, 
therefore, an equal distribution of probability of harm of an activity entails 
neither an equal (or fair) distribution of chance of harm for individuals, nor an 
equal (or fair) distribution of outcome for them. 
 
Instead of the probability of harm of an activity, Hayenhjelm suggests sources 
of risks, together with the appropriate knowledge of the determinants of the 
harm, enable us to distribute the actual chance of harm, e.g. by allocating (or 
relocating) the sources from individuals who are highly susceptible to the risks to 
those who are less susceptible, one can then distribute (or redistribute) their 
actual chance of suffering from the harm. Moreover, she also points out that it is 
possible to manage, to some extent, the actualisation of harm by providing 
precautionary measures to reduce the risks and thus the (actual) chance of 
harm.12 Through distributing the sources of risks and precautionary measures 
against those risks, we can then indirectly distribute chance of harm and the 
outcome. Here, it is important to note that the distribution of sources of risks 
and the distribution of precautionary measures are two distinct, but interrelated, 
dimensions for the distribution of risk. Ideally, a fair distribution of risk will 
consist both a fair distribution of sources of risks and a fair distribution of 
precautionary measures. Yet, in cases where individuals are exposed to 
additional amount of sources of risks, it could in principle be remedied by a 
provision of extra amount of precautionary measures to them, and vice versa. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Following	  Lenman	  (2008),	  Hayenhjelm	  argues	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  precautionary	  measures	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  treating	  each	  individual	  equally,	  and	  thus	  is	  an	  additional	  reason	  for	  taking	  precautionary	  measures	  as	  the	  proper	  object	  of	  distribution	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  risk.	  I	  agree	  with	  Lenman	  and	  Hayenhjelm	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  respect	  for	  individuals	  in	  answering	  the	  question	  of	  distributive	  justice;	  however,	  I	  think	  their	  position	  ties	  too	  closely	  with	  contractualism.	  As	  the	  provision	  of	  precautionary	  measures	  has	  significant	  implication	  to	  actualisation	  of	  harms,	  the	  distribution	  of	  precautionary	  measures	  should	  be	  indispensible	  in	  discussion	  of	  just	  (or	  fair)	  distribution	  of	  risk	  regardless	  of	  the	  one’s	  theoretical	  commitment.	  





Having outlined the reasons for taking sources of risks and precautionary 
measures as the object of distribution in the distribution of risk, I now turn to 
the case of geoengineering and demonstrate how a risk-based approach works. 
In considering whether or not a geoengineering option is just, the risk-based 
approach will assess the distribution of the sources of risks associated with a 
geoengineering option and the distribution of precautionary measures against 
the potential harms from it. However, it should be reminded that since different 
geoengineering options operate in different ways, the applicability of the criteria 
might vary from one option to another. 
 
For the distribution of the sources of geoengineering risks, we have to 
distinguish between the risks associated with technical artefacts and 
infrastructures of geoengineering and those associated with the overall impacts 
of implementation. So long as we cannot direct specific changes in the climate 
system and the precise location(s) where those changes happen, which are the 
sources of risks associated with the overall impacts of an implementation, the 
distribution of the sources of geoengineering risks will mostly concern with 
geoengineering options that are intensive in the use of technical artefacts and 
infrastructures that are themselves risky or potentially harmful, or those that 
have ostensible local impacts. For these geoengineering options, the question 
should therefore be framed in terms of the siting of geoengineering options, i.e. 
whether they – being the sources of risks and potential harms – are being 
distributed fairly. For other geoengineering options which do not have ostensible 
local impacts, and for the overall impacts of implementation, the sources of 
geoengineering risks cannot be the object of distribution in the distribution of 
geoengineering risks; however, they remain useful in exploring the question of 
distributive justice in geoengineering, as we can – with appropriate knowledge of 
the determinants of harms, capture the distribution of (actual) chance of harms 
from geoengineering options.  
 
The distribution of precautionary measures, on the other hand, is more 
broadly applicable to various geoengineering options. The aim is to distribute 
precautionary measures to reduce the geoengineering risks and thus (actual) 
chance of harms from geoengineering. Accordingly, the question of distributive 
justice in geoengineering should focus on: (i) risks of geoengineering options for 
various locations, including both the risks associated with technical artefacts and 
infrastructure and those associated with the overall impacts of implementation; 
(ii) precautionary measures available for the reduction of those risks; and, (iii) 
the distribution of the precautionary measures to regions where geoengineering 




risks are expected to be materialised, or to individuals who are susceptible to 
the geoengineering risks. 
 
I shall now contrast the risk-based approach to the question of distributive 
justice in geoengineering with the normative analysis of sulphate aerosol 
geoengineering by Svoboda, Keller, Goes and Tuana (2011, 161-167). In their 
analysis, they note that sulphate aerosol geoengineering is likely to reduce 
precipitation considerably in Africa, South America, and southeastern Asia, which 
in turn could threaten food production and fresh water supplies in those regions. 
They then argue that the potential outcomes of sulphate aerosol geoengineering 
violate normative distributive principles in various theories of justice, and thus 
being unjust (or unfair). It is useful to point out that their normative analysis is 
based on the probability of the harmful events associated with the 
implementation of sulphate aerosol geoengineering; however, the probability of 
the harms of the implementation says little – if not nothing – about the regions’ 
or the individuals’ chance of suffering from the harms. In short, their normative 
analysis has failed to take into account whether (and how) the harms of an 
implementation of sulphate aerosol geoengineering will be actualised; and, 
without that, it is difficult to see why an implementation of sulphate aerosol 
geoengineering will be unjust and for whom it will be unjust. 
 
Unlike their analysis, a risk-based approach begins by looking at the 
distribution of sources of geoengineering risks. In the case of sulphate aerosol 
geoengineering, it will not be possible to distribute the sources, as the risks are 
associated with the overall impact of implementation which we have no control 
over;13 and, the knowledge we have about sulphate aerosol geoengineering 
suggests that some regions, e.g. Africa, South America, and southeastern Asia, 
will have more (actual) chance to be harmed by sulphate aerosol 
geoengineering. For the risk-based approach, however, it does not immediately 
imply that sulphate aerosol geoengineering will be unfair. To determine whether 
or not an implementation of sulphate aerosol geoengineering will be unfair, the 
risk-based approach also requires us to examine the precautionary measures 
provided to those regions for the reduction of the risks of droughts and thus 
(actual) chance of being harmed by them. Indeed, if a policy to implement 
sulphate aerosol geoengineering is accompanied by a policy to provide those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The	  sources	  of	  risks	  of	  sulphate	  aerosol	  geoengineering	  will	  become	  important	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  geoengineering	  risks	  if	  (i)	  sulphate	  aerosols	  are	  found	  to	  be	  potentially	  harmful	  for	  individuals,	  or	  (ii)	  the	  injection	  of	  sulphate	  aerosols	  is	  found	  to	  have	  site-­‐specific	  impacts.	  In	  cases	  of	  (i)	  or	  (ii),	  the	  locations	  of	  implementation	  should	  be	  a	  consideration	  in	  the	  question	  of	  distributive	  justice	  in	  geoengineering.	  




regions suitable precautionary measures, e.g. drought prevention and mitigation 
facilities, it is less obvious that the policy will necessarily be unjust. 
 
The risk-based approach is also useful in guiding policy on geoengineering 
research. For geoengineering research that is expected to produce potentially 
harmful outcomes, the research itself could be viewed as a source of 
geoengineering risks. The risk-based approach thus requires us to examine the 
agendas of the research and evaluate who will be subjected to the risks and is 
likely to be harmed. If the research disproportionally affects one group of 
individuals, then it could be deemed as unfair with respect to the distribution of 
the sources of geoengineering risks; and, the risk-based approach calls for a 
provision of suitable precautionary measures to those who will be adversely 
affected by the research, for the research to be fair.14 One practical implication 
of the risk-based approach for geoengineering research is that it calls serious 
attention to the need of research on precautionary measures in conjunction with 
geoengineering research.	  
 
Distributing Geoengineering Risks: Egalitarianism, Prioritarianism, and 
Sufficientarianism 
So far, I have argued against the outcome-based approach to the question of 
distributive justice in geoengineering, and have suggested a shift to a risk-based 
approach. I have also show how a risk-based approach would look like and work 
with Hayenhjelm’s account of distributive justice and risk. What remains 
unexplored is how geoengineering risks should be distributed. To answer this 
question, one must first provide a normative account of a fair distribution. Doing 
so, however, requires a more detailed examination of various theories of 
distributive justice, and a defence of a version of them. In effect, in actual 
policy-making, what views of distributive justice are acceptable is likely to 
depend on the social and cultural circumstances (Rayner 1995), and to defend a 
specific account of distributive justice might be not be fruitful – or, it might even 
be counter-productive – for guiding geoengineering policy. So, instead of 
arguing for a specific theory of distributive justice and justifying a particular way 
to distribute geoengineering risks, I shall illustrate what three major accounts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  notion	  of	  disproportionality,	  however,	  is	  not	  unproblematic.	  Particularly,	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  imposition	  of	  risk	  is	  disproportionate	  will	  be	  decided	  by	  individuals’	  beliefs	  and	  values,	  including	  their	  perception	  of	  risk	  and	  harm.	  So	  construed,	  the	  question	  of	  (dis)proportionality	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  normative	  question	  remains	  to	  be	  answered.	  




distributive justice, i.e. egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism, 
recommend on the distribution of geoengineering risks.15  
 
Egalitarianism holds that equality has intrinsic value, and thus inequality is in 
itself wrong or unfair. In the crude form, egalitarianism aims at an equal 
distribution of the relevant distribuendum (see, e.g. Rawls 1971; Dworkin 
1981a, 1981b; Cohen 1989; Arneson 1989; Temkin 1993). A geoengineering 
policy based on an egalitarian view of justice requires an equal distribution of 
geoengineering risks, that is – an equal exposure to the sources of 
geoengineering risks on the basis of our knowledge about the determinants of 
the harms and an equal provision of the precautionary measures against those 
risks. In cases where precautionary measures are not equally distributed, the 
sources of geoengineering risks must be allocated away from those whose 
precautionary measures are insufficient. Alternatively, when equal exposure to 
the sources is impossible, the provision of precautionary measures must be 
enough to offset the inequality in the distribution of sources. Hence, an 
egalitarian view of justice does not imply that each individual should be exposed 
to the exact same amount of the sources and/or should be provided the exact 
same amount of precautionary measures under the geoengineering policy. 
 
A major problem for the egalitarian view of justice is known as the “levelling 
down objection” (Parfit 2000). The “levelling down objection” points out that it is 
possible to achieve equality by reducing the general level of well-being, and if 
equality is the only aim of distributive justice, it has the counter-intuitive result 
that a situation where every individual equally worse off is better than a 
situation in which some individuals are better off – even very slightly – than 
others. In the context of geoengineering policy, it entails a counter-intuitive 
consequence that maximising exposure to the sources or minimising 
precautionary measures is morally acceptable so long as the goal is to achieve 
equality in the distribution of geoengineering risks. There are various responses 
to the levelling down objection proposed by egalitarians. For example, 
egalitarians might accept that equality is neither the only intrinsic value, nor the 
sole consideration in the distributive justice (see, e.g. O'Neill 2008; Hausman & 
Waldren 2011). In short, those who attempt to ground geoengineering policy on 
an egalitarian view of justice, at least, have to account for the levelling down 
objection. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Unfortunately,	  all	  these	  accounts	  of	  distributive	  justice	  have	  a	  variety	  of	  formulations,	  and	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  offer	  a	  comprehensive	  review	  of	  them.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  these	  accounts	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  see	  Vallentyne	  (2007),	  Meyer	  &	  Roser	  (2006).	  




Prioritarianism offers an alternative to egalitarian view of justice. It does not 
ascribe intrinsic value to equality, it instead holds that “benefiting people 
matters more the worse off these people are” (Parfit 2000, 101; also, see 
McKerlie 1994; Holtung 2007). In accordance with a prioritarian view of justice, 
the distribution of geoengineering risks will be sensitive to the vulnerability to 
the geoengineering risks and the (actual) chance of harms from geoengineering, 
and priority will be given to those who are more vulnerable and have a higher 
chance of actualising the harms. Accordingly, prioritarians will recommend a 
geoengineering policy to impose fewer sources of geoengineering risks to those 
who are more susceptible, and provide more precautionary measures to those 
who are likely to be harmed. In short, the aim is promote absolute level of well-
being by reducing the risks and (actual) chance of harms of those who those 
who are more prone to them. Depends on the version of prioritarianism one 
maintains, the recommended geoengineering policy can either always prioritise 
those who are more vulnerable, or it can prioritise those who are more 
vulnerable unless sufficiently great benefit arises from not doing so.16 
 
The final view of justice I shall consider is sufficientarianism, which maintains 
“what is important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should 
have the same but that each should have enough” (Frankfurt 1987, 21; also, see 
Crisp 2003; Huseby 2010; Shields 2012). In other words, sufficientarianism 
presupposes a threshold of sufficiency, and its aim is to provide that level of 
goods to every individual. So construed, it does not ascribe intrinsic value to 
equality, nor does it prioritises the worse off in distribution. In the context of 
geoengineering policy, a sufficientarian view of justice thus recommends every 
individual should be sufficiently safe from geoengineering risks, i.e. a sufficiently 
low exposure to the sources of geoengineering risks and a sufficient provision of 
precautionary measures against those risks. Of course, the sufficientarian view 
of justice is not without problems, and particularly relevant here is the threshold 
of sufficiency, i.e. what is enough. For the sufficientarian view of justice to 
provide any meaningful recommendation to geoengineering policy, it will require 
an acceptable account of the threshold of sufficiency. 
 
I have outlined the geoengineering policy that would be recommended by 
egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism. In short, different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  discussion	  here	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  geoengineering	  risks,	  i.e.	  the	  sources	  of	  geoengineering	  risks	  and	  the	  precautionary	  measures	  against	  them.	  If	  the	  prioritarian	  view	  of	  justice	  is	  applied	  more	  broadly	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  well-­‐being,	  it	  will	  have	  further	  implication	  on	  the	  geoengineering	  research	  and	  implementation.	  In	  terms	  of	  geoengineering	  research,	  the	  prioritarian	  view	  should	  recommend	  research	  agendas	  that	  benefit	  the	  worse	  off.	  Similarly,	  it	  should	  only	  recommend	  implementation	  that	  benefits	  the	  worse	  off	  too.	  




accounts of distributive justice will evaluate geoengineering policy differently 
based on the normative criteria they hold, i.e. equality, priority (of the 
vulnerable regions and individuals), and sufficiency; and, the normative 
distributive principles correspond to egalitarianism, prioritarianism and 
sufficientarianism will recommend different geoengineering policy with respect to 
the implementation. To reiterate, my aim is not to defend any of them as the 
correct account of distributive justice for the distribution of geoengineering risks, 
to do so requires a more comprehensive analysis of various versions of those 
theories and their viability in actual policy-making. 
 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper is to illustrate an alternative approach to the 
question of distributive justice in geoengineering, i.e. the risk-based approach. I 
have discussed two problems of the outcome-based approach, namely the ‘if and 
then’ syndrome and the limited applicability of distributive principles in 
geoengineering policy. Particularly, I note that the question of distributive justice 
in geoengineering arises in an important part due to the fact that differentiated 
degree of risks are being imposed to various regions and groups of individuals 
through geoengineering research and its implementation. Risks, therefore, ought 
to be taken as an object of distribution in the context of geoengineering. Based 
on Hayenhjelm’s (2012) account of fair distribution of risk, I demonstrate how 
geoengineering risks could be distributed. Finally, to show how major accounts 
of distributive justice can be used in answering the question of distributive 
justice in geoengineering, I briefly apply the risk-based approach with 
egalitarianism, prioritarianism and sufficientarianism. It should demonstrate the 
risk-based approach is a viable – and, indeed, a more fruitful – approach than 
the outcome-based approach. Although my discussion of the recommendation on 
geoengineering policy from egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism 
is far from complete, it should provide a blueprint for developing a more detailed 
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